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Two mathematical programs are developed which determine strategies to
interdict a network using limited resources. The first model identifies a set of arcs
whose interdiction minimizes the maximum flow through the network, constrained by
the available resources. The solution is a set of segments to interdict and a set of
segments which are not interdicted, but determine the maximum flow in the
interdicted network. The second model identifies a set of arcs whose interdiction
isolates a targeted demand node and a maximum number of contiguous nodes about
this specified node. This model is developed to take into account that the exact
location of the demand node may not be known with certainty. The models are
applied to a sample network that is similar to a river and road network in Bolivia
where counter-narcotic interdiction operations are being conducted to stop the flow
of precursor chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine. Insights drawn from the
models' solutions are discussed.
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been
made, within the time available, to ensure that the program is free of computational
and logic errors, it cannot be considered validated, any application of this program
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop mathematical programming tools to assist
counter-narcotics agents in South America who plan riverine and ground operations
by helping them position their limited assets, i.e., interdiction teams on the waterways
and roads, to most effectively stem the flow of chemicals used in the production of
cocaine.
The United States has been engaged in a war since 1980, a war on drugs. A great
deal of effort and money has been expended trying to educate the public, enforce
current drug laws and assist South American countries in stemming the flow of illicit
drugs out of their countries. Despite all that has been done, the situation has changed
little since the war on drugs started. The producers of illicit drugs are motivated by
profits and continue to find ways to increase production efficiency, decrease the chance
of being detected and establish low-risk, high-volume transportation routes to move
drugs. Many national and international agencies are working to disrupt the production
and distribution process. The basic problem this thesis addresses is how best to
interdict the flow of chemicals, which are precursors of cocaine, into a drug-producing
region given the limited interdiction assets available.
1. Cocaine Production Process
One of the major drugs targeted for interdiction is cocaine. There are
numerous ways to produce cocaine depending on the situation and availability of the
ingredients. The production of cocaine is not tightly controlled by large organizations.
The process encompasses a large number of people working independently, who are
involved in only a few of the production steps, or who provide the supplies to meet the
market demand for precursor chemicals, coca leaves, or some stage of the processed
cocaine. This decentralized structure makes it difficult to hinder the production of
illicit drugs, because when one person in the structure is removed, others are able to
move in and replace the person.
The following is a generic "recipe" for producing one kilogram of cocaine
hydrochloride (HC1). First, 247 Kilograms of coca leaves are macerated in a solution
of kerosene, sodium bicarbonate and sulfuric acid in simple, plastic-lined pits. The
residue, 3.3 Kilograms of coca paste, is collected and transported to the next processing
site. The paste is mixed with sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate and ammonium
hydroxide to remove a majority of the impurities. The mixture is dried and 1.1
Kilograms of cocaine base remains. The cocaine base is then taken to a cocaine
laboratory where chemists mix precise amounts of ethyl ether, acetone and
hydrochloric acid to remove the final impurities and produce 1 Kilogram of cocaine
HC1. Finally, the cocaine is packaged and distributed to markets in the United States
and elsewhere for consumption.
2. The Role of Precursor Chemicals
The entire process of producing cocaine is based on the availability of
certain chemicals, or substitutes, at each stage. These chemicals are known as
"precursor chemicals". All precursor chemicals have legitimate uses in industry and
large quantities are imported into the Andean countries each year. The quantities
needed for illicit drug production are thought to amount to less than 1% of the total
imported each year. The precursor chemicals are legally brought into the country, and
then diverted for illicit use. The Drug Enforcement Agency is making major efforts
to minimize the amount of chemical diverted for illicit purposes, but precursor
chemicals are still diverted despite these efforts.
3. Why Focus on Precursor Chemicals?
The focus of this thesis is on precursor chemicals and not on processed
cocaine or coca leaves. Without precursor chemicals to process the plentiful coca
leaves, drug production stops. The chemicals are not found in the region and are
required in large quantities. This necessitates using the road and river network for
moving the chemicals. Coca is grown throughout much of the region, providing a
ready supply. Coca leaves can also be economically transported by men and animals
off the normal transportation routes, where interdiction is much more difficult. Since
precursor chemicals usually are shipped in 55-gallon drums, it would be hard and less
economical to move them off normal transportation routes. Once processed, however,
cocaine can be moved in various size packages, limited only by the imagination of the
narcos, i.e. persons involved in the illegal production of narcotics. Because of this
flexibility, interdiction of cocaine in paste, base and HC1 form is very difficult. The
dependence on precursor chemicals can be considered a weak link in the illicit drug
production chain.
4. Scope of Project
a. General
Bolivia is the second largest supplier of coca leaf for the international
illicit cocaine market; Peru is the largest. The estimated area under coca cultivation
in Bolivia is between 33,000 and 48,000 hectares which could yield 46,000 to 67,800
metric tons of coca leaves. This amount could produce approximately 92 to 135 metric
tons of cocaine HC1 per harvest. The coca leaf is harvested four times a year, resulting
in enough coca leaves to produce up to 540 metric tons of cocaine HC1 per year. (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1988, pp. 3-4)
b. Area of interest
The areas of interest in this project are the Chapare and Beni regions
and the Mamore river basin of Bolivia. (See Figure 1.) The Chapare region in Bolivia
produces an estimated 60 to 75 percent of the coca cultivated in Bolivia. The coca
leaves are harvested and the paste is made in the Chapare. The paste is shipped out
of the Chapare by the Rios Ichilo and Chapare' to the Mamor6 river basin and lower
Beni region, where the base is produced. The base is then converted into cocaine HC1
in the upper Beni region or flown out of the country to laboratories in other South
American countries, principally Columbia.
c Interdiction opportunities
Bolivia and the United States are expanding counter-narcotic efforts
to include the interdiction of precursor chemicals in Bolivia. These precursor
chemicals must be transported primarily along waterways, from points of entry to the
laboratories located in remote regions, providing an opportunity for interdiction.
Bolivia, with assistance from the United States, maintains riverine and ground forces,
the "Blue Devils", in this region for the purpose of interdicting drug and precursor
chemical traffic.
Figure 1 Map of Bolivia with the Chapare region and the Mamore river basin
outlined.
B. THE BASIC PROBLEM
1. Geography of the Region
The broad eastern plains of Bolivia provide an excellent region for narcos
to produce cocaine. The region is primarily tropical three-canopy rain forest. There
are very few all-weather roads, but there is an elaborate system of navigable rivers,
which reaches to the base of the Andes. The absence of roads makes the waterways
the primary means of transporting goods throughout the region from the major cities
in the area.
There is a wide variation in the physical nature of the waterways. Rivers
vary in width from 12 feet to 12 miles, while tributaries can be as narrow as 1-2 feet.
During the rainy season, the rivers swell and new tributaries become navigable to
small boats and canoes. During the dry season, many small tributaries dry up and
become dirt roads, but the major rivers are still navigable. There are several deep
draft ports near the base of the Andes which are accessible all year long.
2. The Transportation Network
Given the river system, the lack of roads and the lack of mobility off the
roads, the transportation routes in the region can be depicted as a network. The
network used to evaluate the interdiction models developed in this thesis is based on
the river and road network in the Beni region of Bolivia. This region has three major
river systems which flow into the Mamore south of Trinidad. One all-weather
highway crosses the upper parts of the rivers near the foot of the Andes. However,
there are several illicit airfields in the area, which could be assumed to connect with
the river system by road or trail and be used for transportation of precursors. For
simplicity, but without loss of generality, these airfields are not considered.
C. LITERATURE SEARCH AND ANECDOTAL BACKGROUND
1. Counter-narcotic Efforts
The following information on counter-narcotic efforts was gathered during
interviews in November and December 1990 with representatives of organizations
named below, during a trip to Panama and Washington, D.C. Many different
government agencies are working to stem the flow of illicit drugs, and each is
approaching the problem based on the strengths, characteristics and capabilities of
their particular organization.
a. Key people and organization matrix
The Joint Tactical Intelligence Center at the Pentagon is working on
a three-dimensional matrix which identifies key people and organizations by specific
steps in cocaine production, geographical area and time. Once the linkages are known,
it may be possible to disrupt the production process by targeting a few key people who
are principally responsible for certain steps of the production process.
b. Transportation ofprecursor chemical on waterways
The DB-5 section of the Defense Intelligence Agency Center, Boiling
Air Force Base, is studying on the transportation of precursor chemicals on South
American waterways. They provided information on the scope of the waterway
network, problems associated with the region e.g., the seasonal changes in the river
network and the lack of river navigation information for the a majority of the region,
and a detailed map of a portion of the Bolivian waterways in the drug production
region.
c Global movement ofprecursor chemicals
The Diversion Operations section of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
tracks large-scale, global movement of precursor chemicals. They maintain a database
on all chemical shipments from the United States. The agency attempts to certify that
the recipients of the shipments are not connected with drug trafficking and will use
the chemicals for legitimate purposes. They publish a pamphlet defining exactly what
chemicals are considered precursors and outlining the requirements for shipment of
precursor chemicals.
d. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) initiatives
Several SOUTHCOM organizations are working on the problem of drug
interdiction in South America. The Deputy Director, Drugs section is working on
creating a "Think Tank" consisting of all the elements working in the area, linked
together by the Command Management System (CMS). CMS will, among other things,
provide data and communications links that allow time-sensitive information to be
passed to all agencies involved in counter-narcotic operations in a matter of seconds.
The "Think Tank" would coordinate all counter-narcotics interdiction efforts to
increase effectiveness and bring together experts from different fields and provide a
forum for the exchange and integration of information.
SOUTHCOM J-2, Intelligence, follows the current trends in drug
production and maintains information on drug production activities in various
countries. SOUTHCOM J5-RW, Wargaming, is developing drug lab interdiction
scenarios for use with the JANUS-A (U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center, 1986) high
resolution combat model, to provide training for law enforcement agencies in countries
where drug production takes place.
2. Network Interdiction Models
During the 1960s and 1970s, network interdiction models were studied
extensively, due in part to the problem of interdicting supply routes in the Vietnam
War. Much of the work was based on related material from the 1950s. This section
describes some of the models developed and techniques employed to solve the models.
Ford and Fulkerson (1962) develop the well known max flow - min cut
theorem which provides the basis on which many other works build. Their theorem
states that the maximum flow in a network is equal to the capacity of the minimal cut
set in the network. By using a maximum flow algorithm, it is possible to determine
which arcs are in the minimal cut-set. These arcs should be targeted for interdiction
if the resources expended to interdict an arc do not vary significantly from one arc to
another. Their theorem is also useful to determine how all paths between two
specified nodes can be broken with the minimal expenditure of resources. If the
network data is redefined so that the effort to interdict an arc is used as the capacity
on the arc in a max flow problem, the minimal capacity cut will identify the arcs to
interdict at lowest effort.
Wollmer (1970) develops two heuristic algorithms for targeting strikes
against a Lines of Communication network. The problem he addresses is determining
the most important arc in the network that when interdicted, increases the cost of
using the network the most. The cost to the user is based on the unit-flow cost, repair
time and repair cost. The first algorithm assumes the cost function is linear and the
second, piecewise linear with one breakpoint. Wollmer assumes the network user is
attempting to achieve a certain level of flow circulation at a minimum cost. The
algorithms determine a value for each arc, which is a function of the repair cost and
resulting increase in transportation cost when an arc is interdicted. Wollmer uses a
combined formulation of the required flow and maximum flow problems to determine
the actual cost due to interdiction. The formulation, called "minimum-cost
circulation", finds a minimum cost flow to meet the required flow if the network will
support the flow, and if not, the maximum flow is found. The arc with the largest
value is then interdicted. If the problem allows multiple arcs to be interdicted, the
algorithm is repeated with previously interdicted and unrepaired arcs at their
interdicted capacities.
In another paper (1964), Wollmer presents an labeling algorithm to
determine the set of n arcs to remove in a planar network which minimizes flow. The
topological dual of the primal network (see Lawler (1976) for a discussion of the
topological dual) is used by the algorithm. In this dual network, a node is created for
each face in the primal network and dual nodes in adjacent faces are connected by dual
arcs. Also, a dual source, s', and dual sink, t\ are created on the exterior face of the
primal network and connected to dual nodes in adjacent faces. Each dual arc is then
assigned a length equal to the capacity of the primal arc it crosses. The shortest path
from s' to t' in the dual network then corresponds to the minimal capacity cut in the
primal network. Wollmer's methodology can be thought of as working on a modified
dual network in which each dual arc is replaced by two arcs in parallel, one with length
and one with length equal to the capacity of the primal arc being crossed. The
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problem then becomes one of finding the shortest path from s' to t' in the dual
network, using at most n zero-length arcs. The set of zero-length arcs in the shortest
path correspond to the set of arcs to remove in the primal network to minimize the
maximum flow. Wollmer's methodology is straightforward and attractive because it
solves the problem in polynomial time. However, the methodology is limited because
it requires a planar network and assumes that the amount of resource necessary to
interdict an arc is the same for all arcs.
Helmbold (1971) uses dynamic programming to solve a generalization of
Wollmer's model in which the resource necessary to interdict an arc may vary among
arcs. The algorithm can be thought of as using the same modified dual network used
by Wollmer, described above, but where the zero-length dual arcs now require some
positive integer amount of resource to traverse. Helmbold uses a backward recursion
to find the shortest path from s' to f constrained by the resources available. The
recursion applied to the modified dual network is effectively
Fj(x) = min { Fk (x- r k ) , Fk {x) + L k }
(J. k) € FS(j)
where FXx) denotes the shortest path distance from node j to node f which uses x
units of resource, FS(J) denotes the forward star ofj, i.e., the set of arcs directed out
of j, Ljk is the length of arc (J,k) which uses no resources, and rjk is the amount of
resource consumed by traversing the zero-length arc (j,k). Because the number of
steps taken by the algorithm depends on the total available resources, it is a pseudo-
polynomial time algorithm.
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McMasters and Mustin (1970) develop another algorithm for interdicting
a planar network with limited resources. The problem they address is essentially the
same as Helmbold's, but their approach is different. Their algorithm determines
which targets, or arcs, to interdict and how much effort to expend. They develop the
topological dual of the capacitated flow network, and determine the shortest path
through the fully interdicted dual. The interdiction cost is then determined and
compared to the resources. If it is less than the resources, the problem is solved. If
the resource constraint is exceeded, the algorithm attempts to "unspend" the resources
while increasing the flow as little as possible. The resources are unspent along the
shortest path until the resource constraint is met. The algorithm looks next for the
second shortest path and repeats the resource check and the unspending process. The
distance of the second shortest path is compared to the distance to the first distance
and the smaller is saved as the best solution. The process continues until the distance
of the ith shortest path is longer than the current best solution. The algorithm is
designed for problems where at least one arc has a lower bound greater than zero. If
all arcs can be interdicted to zero flow, the algorithm must evaluate all feasible length,
loopless routes through the dual.
Preston (1972) uses dynamic programming to identify the optimal allocation
of aircraft for an airstrike against a planar transportation network. He uses an
exponential damage function to determine the relative cost of allocating another
aircraft to interdict an arc versus the benefit of the interdiction. The topological dual
is constructed from the planar network, and the shortest path through the dual
network is found using the capacities of the arcs in the original network as the lengths
of the corresponding dual arcs. Next, the arcs of the dual are assigned lengths equal
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to the fully interdicted capacities of the corresponding arcs in the original network.
The set of all shortest paths, S, is found such that their lengths do not exceed the
length of the shortest path found for the uninterdicted network. For each path in S,
a recursive equation is used to find the optimal allocation of aircraft to the arcs, for
1 to K aircraft. The flow is determined at each level of interdiction for each path.
The optimal allocation for 1 to K aircraft is then determined by comparing the level
of flow in each path in S for the allocated aircraft. The final decision on aircraft
allocation is based on a cost/benefit function for the addition of one more aircraft.
Starting with aircraft, the algorithm determines if one more aircraft is cost-effective.
If the benefit is greater than the cost, another aircraft is used. It is extremely difficult
to define an acceptable cost/benefit function, and once defined, the answer is very
sensitive to the function used. The example used in the paper equates the dollar cost
of operating an aircraft with the dollar benefit of interdicting a ton of enemy supplies.
Information on the dollar cost of operating the aircraft is available, but it is difficult
to place a dollar cost on a ton of interdicted supplies. Preston shows that the optimal
solution could be to send no aircraft on interdiction missions because the return is not
high enough. If the problem to be solved were purely economical, with outcomes
based on dollar amounts, this model might useful. However, given the nature of drug
interdiction, the model does not seem very useful. Furthermore, the enumeration of
the set S is likely to require an exponential amount of work in general.
Durbin (1966) develops an interdiction model which evaluates flow through
a network as arcs are successively destroyed and repaired. The model uses Fulkerson's
Out-of-Kilter Algorithm to profile the maximum cargo flow as a function of available
vehicles traveling on a given highway system. The profile solution is found by
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considering the inverse problem of the number of trucks required to support a certain
flow. This is done by increasing the flow from to the maximum throughput,
evaluating the number of trucks required at pre-determined profile points. Then,
based on the estimated number of trucks available to the network user, Wollmer's
algorithm (Wollmer, 1974) is used to destroy the arc that reduces flow most. These
steps are repeated until there are no more interdiction assets remaining or flow is
stopped. The step-wise removal of arcs in this model does not ensure the solution
found is optimal.
Lubore, Ratliffand Sicilia (1971) develop an algorithm that, given capacities
on the arcs of a network, determines the single most vital link in the network with
respect to maximum flow. The algorithm assumes that the interdiction cost for each
arc is the same. Their work is an improvement over an earlier algorithm by Wollmer
(1963). Wollmer's algorithm requires complete enumeration of all arcs, while this
improved algorithm reduces the number of arcs considered as candidates by
establishing a necessary condition for an arc to be most vital. The value of arc (xy) is
defined as the difference in maximum flow in [N;A1 and [N;{A - (x^)}] between the
given source and sink. Their algorithm requires the flow in arc (ij) to be at least as
great as the flow over every arc in a minimal cut-set for some maximum flow pattern
in [N;A1 before it is considered. Their work is applicable in determining the single
most valuable arc in the network, but it is not capable of finding the most vital set of
arcs for sets with cardinality greater than 1.
In a later paper, Ratliff, Sicilia and Lubore (1975) present an algorithm
which finds a set of n arcs, whose removal from the network results in the greatest
decrease in throughput of the remaining system between the source and sink. This
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is the same problem that Wollmer (1964) addresses, but the methodology of these
authors is applicable to both planar and nonplanar networks. Their algorithm uses a
modified network in which all arc capacities are set at the smaller of a specified value,
u, or the arc's original capacity. The value of u starts at 1 and is increased by 1 until
the algorithm terminates. The minimum cut-sets are then determined for the
modified network using a maximum flow algorithm. If the cardinality of the minimum
cut-set is equal to n, the algorithm terminates. Otherwise u is incremented by 1, the
network is again modified and the minimum cut sets are determined. When this is
successful, it finds a most vital link set of cardinality 1, then 2, etc., up to n. If the
procedure is not successful, the authors use a partitioning branch and bound procedure
to limit the enumeration required to determine the optimal arc set. This algorithm
does not take interdiction cost into account. However, if a resource constraint and a
cost function were included in the model, it could possibly provide a useful solution
to the problem at hand.
Golden (1978) proposes a model that uses a linear cost function to lengthen
the arcs of a network based on increasing the shortest path via a least-cost investment
strategy. The problem reduces to a minimum cost flow problem which can be easily
solved. He complicates the model by requiring the shortest path to be increased by
at least some value, t, which ensures a predetermined level of difficulty for the
network user. The value of t can be increased or decreased to accommodate a budget
constraint. The model identifies the arcs that are most cost effective in increasing the
shortest path, but does not allow for the removal of arcs from the network.
There are several game-theoretic works that deal with interdiction of
networks. The works by Danskin (1962) and Wollmer (1970) approach network
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interdiction as two-player zero sum games. While these works are of interest and
might usefully be expanded upon for drug interdiction, this thesis will not consider
game-theoretic models.
D. OUTLINE OF PROPOSED MODELS AND SOLUTION TECHNIQUES
1. General
The mathematical programming models proposed here differ from other
techniques used to solve interdiction problems. The formulations used are better than
the other methods because they more easily generalize to different problems. The
narcos' goal is to move supplies of precursor chemicals through the network to specific
locations where the chemicals are needed. The models provide solutions to the
interdictor which dictate where to place the limited interdiction assets to most
effectively disrupt the flow of chemicals.
The actual Mamore river basin network is not used since not all of the
information needed is available and some of the information is classified. The
transportation network used to evaluate the models is semi-randomly generated by a
FORTRAN program. River and road segments are created and assigned values for the
capacity and the required number of interdiction assets to disrupt flow on the arc.
The supply locations for precursor chemicals are set. The models, formulated in
GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, 1988), use data from the network to set up the
equations. GAMS/ZOOM (Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, 1988) or XA (Sunset
Software, 1987), mixed integer program solvers, are then used to solve the problem.
The resulting solution is a set of river and road segments to be considered for
interdiction. This thesis considers two different network interdiction models:
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2. Model 1 - Minimize the Maximum Flow
This model identifies a set of river and road segments whose interdiction
minimizes the maximum flow through the network, constrained by the available
assets. The solution is a set of segments to interdict and a set of segments that are
not interdicted. The set of segments not interdicted determine the maximum flow in
the network.
3. Model 2 - Maximize the Number of Nodes Isolated
The second model identifies a set of river and road segments whose
interdiction isolates a specified node and a maximum number of other nodes
surrounding the specified node. This model attempts to take into account the
uncertainty involved in pinpointing the exact location of a suspected drug lab. If a
certain area is thought to contain a drug lab, cutting off the entire area should stop
the flow of precursor chemicals to the site. The objective of this model is to maximize
the number of nodes, including the specified node, isolated from the supply nodes by
interdicting segments without exceeding the available assets.
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II. NETWORK INTERDICTION MODELS
A. DESCRIPTION OF A NETWORK
A network is a directed graph, G = (NA), where N and A are specially defined
sets whose elements may have parameters associated with them. N is the finite set
of nodes or vertices, N = {l,2,...,ra}, and A is a set of ordered pairs from AT called arcs
or edges; A = {(ij),(k,l),...,(s,t)}, where ij,k,l,..,,s,t e N. For an arc (ij), i is the tail
node, or where the arc originates, and j is the head node, where the arc terminates.
In a transportation network, an arc (ij) can be thought of as a pipeline or river
segment which carries a flow of liquid from i toj. Let m = \N\, and n = \A\.
Associated with each arc (ij) is its capacity, u
tj and the cost to interdict the arc,
Cy. In this problem, the capacity represents the maximum amount of precursor
chemicals the narcos can transport on a given arc without raising suspicion. The cost
represents the number of interdiction assets required to effectively stop the
transportation of precursor chemicals along the arc and is measured in interdiction
teams.
In the first problem addressed, it is assumed that the narcos are trying to
maximize the amount of precursor chemicals transported to drug labs or maceration
pits in order to maximize the production of cocaine paste and base. In terms of the
network, this is equivalent to maximizing the flow from some source node s to a
demand node t, subject to arc capacities. (This can be further generalized to include
multiple source and demand nodes.) This is the maximum flow problem which can be
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where the sums and inequalities are taken over the existing arcs in the network. The
formulation constraints require conservation of flow for each node. The bounds on x
tJ
imply that the flow cannot exceed the arc's capacity, nor can it be less than zero. The
variable f can be thought of as flow on an artificial arc (t,s), or return arc.
The goal of a network interdictor is to disrupt flow in the network. This may be
done by either isolating the supply node from the demand node, or by minimizing the
maximum flow between the two nodes. In order to discuss these ideas, it is useful to
define a cut-set and the capacity of the cut-set. Let X be any set of nodes in the
network such that X contains node s but not node t. Let X' = N - X. Then (XJC) =
{(ij) : i g X,j € X'} is called a cut-set separating node t from node s (Bazaraa, Jarvis
and Sherali, 1990, p. 565). The max-flow min-cut theorem states that the maximum
flow in the network is equal to the capacity of a minimum capacity cut-set, where the
capacity of the cut-set is defined as 2^ u \j
B. THE DUAL OF A MAX FLOW FORMULATION
In the classical maximum flow problem, there is an associated problem that can
be formed called the dual. The dual formulation is
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where u;, corresponds to the flow conservation equations and h^ corresponds to the
bounds x» <. u
tj .
The dual has a solution in which all variables are or 1. If variable
Wj = 1, node i is a member of the of the setX'. If u;, = 0, the node is a member of set
X. h
t]
= 1 indicates membership in the set of arcs directed from set X to set X'.
Therefore the dual of the maximum flow linear program is a minimum capacity cut-set
identification problem.
C. FORMULATION OF THE MODELS
1. Model 1 - Minimize the Maximum Flow
In the first model considered, the interdictor tries to minimize the
maximum flow of chemicals the narcos can move from s to t, subject to the number
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By taking the dual of the inner maximization, and making several substitutions, Wood
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a, = 1 indicates the node is on the demand side of some cut-set (XJC) and
a, = indicates the node is on the supply side of that cut. 5,-,- or p^ take on the value
of 1 if arc (ij) crosses fromX to X". Further, arc (ij) is interdicted if b
tj
= 1. The flow
on the uninterdicted arcs in the cut-set, Py = 1, determines the flow to the demand
node. All other 6
y
and P y are 0. The model can be extended to handle multiple supply
and demand nodes by fixing a, = for all supply nodes i and fixing aj = 1 for all
demand nodes j.
The model can be easily generalized to handle multiple assets necessary to
interdict an arc (for instance ground forces plus the boats needed to conduct riverine
operations), or multiple independent resources which can be used for interdiction (for
instance local police forces or the "Blue Devils"). In the former case, with asset set K,
let Cp be the amount of asset k used by interdicting arc (ij) and let A* be the amount
of asset k available. Then, the constraint
21
E <^ tf sA
(i. j) e A
is replaced by
E V>*- * A * > v kE K
In the latter case, let b
iJk
be 1 if asset k is used to interdict arc (ij) and let
Cp and A A be defined as before. Then, Model 1 is modified to
minimize Y* ug$u
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Clearly, Model 1 assumes that locations of the supply and demand nodes
are known to the interdictor. However, if the exact locations of supply and demand
nodes were known, removal of the nodes by law enforcement agencies might be
preferable to interdiction of transportation routes. If the exact locations are not
known, the model can still be used directly by varying the demand node locations
around the suspected node and comparing the results on the placement of teams and
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the maximum flow. The second model deals more directly with the uncertainty of
demand node locations.
2. Model 2 - Maximum Number of Nodes Isolated
Much of the information available to the network interdictors is of a
general nature and does not specifically identify a laboratory location. Information
may be based on aircraft flights in and out of covert airfields or information from paid
informants concerning drug activity in certain regions. This information may not be
sufficient to mount a raid on a suspected site, but can be sufficient to conduct
interdiction operations. The model isolates as large a set of contiguous nodes as
possible around a suspected demand node in an attempt to heuristically maximize the
chance of isolating the true demand node, given its exact location is unknown. This
is done by maximizing the number of nodes, including the suspected demand node,
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The first constraint forces some cut-set to be formed between the supply
and demand nodes. The value of a, is fixed for the supply and demand nodes.
Multiple demand nodes can be handled in the same manner as the first model, but the
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model is intended for a single demand node. The last constraint is a resource
constraint, where the total number of interdiction teams used cannot exceed the
number available, A. If there are sufficient interdiction assets, this formulation will
identify a cut-set that isolates the largest possible number of nodes. If, however, there
are insufficient assets available to form a cut-set, the problem is infeasible since it is
impossible to isolate the demand node.
As formulated, the model does not enforce the requirement that the nodes
isolated be contiguous. For example,
consider the network in Figure 2. There
is a large segment of the graph which is
a tree that does not contain the demand
node but can be isolated by breaking arc
a which consumes some of the available
assets. Assume that the demand node
can be isolated using a portion of the
remaining interdiction assets. If the
number of additional nodes that the Figure 2 Example where Model 2 yields a
set of non-contiguous nodes,
remaining assets could isolate around
the demand node is less than the number of nodes that could be isolated in the tree,
the tree will be isolated.
There are several ways to avoid this problem. If the network were a tree,
it could be constructed so that all arcs were directed toward the demand node t. The
following constraints would then enforce contiguity:
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Another approach to encourage contiguity is to assign weights to each node, which
decrease as the distance from the demand node t increases. The objective function
then becomes E u>,<r,-, where io, is the weight of node i. Weighting the nodes will also
tend to encircle the demand node by making the nodes at distance k more attractive
than the nodes at distance k + 1. The current model counts a node at distance k > 1
equal to a node adjacent to the posited demand node. (We conjecture that if the
weights decrease sufficiently quickly with distance, this model will, in fact, ensure
contiguity of the isolated nodes.)
It should be noted that Model 2 can be generalized to handle multiple
assets necessary to interdict an arc and multiple independent assets which can be used
to interdict an arc in the same fashion that these generalizations can be made to
Model 1.
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III. APPLICATION OF MODELS
A. NETWORK USED TO EVALUATE MODELS
An actual transportation network was not available to evaluate the models. A
network similar to the real-world network was constructed, using a FORTRAN
program. The program randomly generates a network, based on certain user-supplied
parameters. The network is built from a root node, node 1, and a random number
draw determines the number of arcs, 0, 1, or 2, incident to the node. At the end of
each arc, a numbered node is created. In this manner, a tree representing the river
network is constructed until the network reaches a pre-specified depth. Depth refers
to the distance, in terms of nodes, from node i to the root node. The interdiction costs
and capacities are assigned to each arc as functions of depth. This is done to
incorporate the changing river characteristics for segments that are further upstream
from the root node. At the specified depth, all adjacent nodes are joined by arcs
representing road segments. Arc capacities and interdiction costs for the road
segments are assigned. All arcs in the network are considered undirected and are
replaced with two anti-parallel, directed arcs with the same capacity and interdiction
cost. The root node and the two nodes at the extremes of the road were made supply
nodes by setting a, = 0. The network used to evaluate the model is shown in Figure
3. A listing of the network data, arc capacities and interdiction costs is contained in
Annex A. Annex B contains the formulation of Model 1 in GAMS which was run on
a 486 MS-DOS based computer and solved using XA. A listing of the GAMS
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Figure 3 Network used for analysis. The road is represented by the arcs at the top
of the network between nodes 79 and 113. Node 1 represents the town of Trinidad
and the mouth of the river system.
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formulation of Model 2 is contained in Annex C. Model 2 was run on an AMDAHL
5990 mainframe and solved using GAMS/ZOOM.
B. ANALYSIS OF MODEL 1
1. Scenario
Based on aircraft flights to covert airfields in a certain area, the counter-
narcotic intelligence section suspects that there is a drug laboratory in the vicinity of
node 42. The operational planner is interested in mounting an interdiction effort
against the site. He also needs an idea of the possible scope of the activity at the
node. Currently, this is the only suspected drug laboratory.
2. Interdiction Strategy for Node 42
By setting a 42 = 1 and the number of teams to zero, the planner is able to
use the model to determine the maximum, uninterdicted flow to the demand node.
Using this figure as a baseline, he can then determine the marginal effectiveness of
additional interdiction teams and the best strategy for the placement of the teams.
Table 1 outlines the recommended strategy for different numbers of teams.
TABLE 1
Strategies for Interdicting Node 42, using Model 1
TEAMS USED ARCS WHICH DETERMINE






(9,16) (88,89) (94,93) None 16
1 (9,16) (88,89) (94,93) 13
2 (9,16) (89,90) (89,63) (94,93) 12
3 (26,42) (90,91) (94,93) 12
4 (90,91) (94,93) (26,42) 5
5 (90.91) (16,26) (94,93) 2
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6 (90,91) (16,26) (94,93) 2
7 None (26,43) (91,64)
(92,64)
The results of the model show that the maximum flow to node 42 is 16
units. The largest marginal decrease in flow comes from employing four teams, while
using less than four teams does not reduce flow by more than 25%. There is also no
marginal benefit in using three teams instead of two teams or six teams instead of five
since there is no change in flow. The planner notices that when the all flow is
interdicted, the arcs cut are relatively close to the demand node. Using the table, the
planner now has several options to choose from to reduce the flow of chemicals to the
demand node.
3. Scenario with Multiple Demand Nodes
The mission planner has received information on two additional suspected
drug production sites. Suspected sites are now located in the vicinity of nodes 42, 60
and 69. If possible, the planner would like to combine interdiction operations against
all three sites. If this is not possible, then the planner seeks the best allocation of the
teams which will decrease the throughput of precursor chemical to the drug
laboratories. Of interest is the maximum uninterdicted flow to the demand nodes,
both collectively and individually, and the change in flow caused by the addition of
interdiction teams to the operation. The planner can evaluate the solutions provided
by the model to assist in determining the optimal strategy which minimizes the flow
to the demand nodes.
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4. Interdiction Strategy for Nodes 42, 60 and 69
The baseline flows to the individual demand nodes are found by setting the
corresponding a, = 1 and solving the model. The maximum flow to each node is given
in the Table 2.
TABLE 2
Maximum Flow to Nodes 42, 60 and 69
NODE ARCS WHICH DETERMINE FLOW
(P„ = 1)
FLOW
42 (9,16) (88.89) (94,93) 16
60 (15,24) (84,85) (89,88) 18
69 (46,69) (97,98) (100,99) 21
If each of the nodes is treated as a separate demand node with an operation
directed against it, 17 teams are required to stop all the flow to the nodes. Table 3
shows the arcs to interdict and the number of teams required to achieve this.
TABLE 3
Strategies to Stop Flow to Nodes 42, 60 and 69 Individually
NODE ARCS INTERDICTED (b
v
= 1) TEAMS REQUIRED
42 (26,42) (93,65) (91,64) (92,64) 7
60 (39,60) (85,60) (86,60) 5
69 (46,69) (98,69) (99,69) 5
The zero-flow cut-sets which isolate the nodes are grouped tightly around
the suspected node and do not interfere with flow to the other demand nodes.
However, it may be beneficial to consider combining the operations, since it appears
that interdiction efforts directed against one node could have an effect on flow to
another node. To evaluate this, the planner runs the model with multiple demand
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nodes. Setting a 42 = a 60 = a 69 = 1 and solving the model for different numbers of
teams yields the solutions in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Solutions with Multiple Demand Nodes using Model 1
TEAMS USED ARCS WHICH DETERMINE






(3,6) (46.69) (84,85) (99,100) None 35
1 (3,6) (18,28) (84,85) (101,100) 30
2 (1,2) (79,80) (113,112) (79,55) (113,78) 27
3 (3,6) (18,28) (85,60) (85,86)
(101,100)
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4 (1,2) (79,80) (79,55) (113,78)
(113,112)
20
5 (3,6) (84,85) (46,69) (100,99) 18




7 (3,6) (46,69) (85,60)
(85,86) (100.99)
12








The planner notices that when eight or more teams are committed to the
interdiction effort, node 69 is isolated, (Figure 4). The cut-set which isolates node 69
is the same as zero-flow cut-set found earlier. Five teams are required for this and the
remaining teams interdict flow to nodes 42 and 60. When five teams are used to stop
flow to node 69, the strategies dictated are the same as using three or more teams to
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Figure 4 Solution to Model 1 with 8 teams used to interdict the network, showing
node 69 isolated.
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minimize the maximum flow to nodes 42 and 60. Evaluating the model for nodes 42
and 60 results in the following strategies shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Strategies for Interdicting Nodes 42 and 60 using Model 1
TEAMS USED ARCS WHICH DETERMINE
FLOW (p i7 = 1)
INTERDICTED
ARCS (6y = 1)
FLOW
3 (6,9) (85,60) (85,86)
(93,94)
12
4 (6,9) (85,60) (85,86)
(93,94)
12
5 (6,9) (85,60) (85,86)
(93,94)
12
6 (6,9) (85,60) (85,86)
(93,94)
12
7 (84,85) (98,97) (3,6) 10
8 (85,86) (98,97) (3,6) (85,60) 8
9 (98,97) (3,6) (85,60)
(85,86)
4




Unless more than 6 teams are used to interdict flow to nodes 42 and 60,
the flow will not be decreased. When more than ten teams are used, node 60 is
isolated by the same zero-flow cut-set determined earlier. When 12 teams are used,
the flow to both nodes 42 and 60 is reduced to zero, and each node is isolated by
interdicting the zero-flow cut-sets found earlier.
5. Model 1 Insights
The model can be useful in determining the potential for movement of
precursor chemicals on the existing network and the marginal change in flow based
33
on the number of teams used. The marginal decrease in the maximum flow is large
when relatively few teams are committed, and operations are less localized. But when
there are sufficient assets available, the model isolates nodes independently. If the
information on the demand node location is accurate, the localized solutions may yield
the best solutions for minimizing flow to the demand node with the fewest teams. If
the demand node location is uncertain, the localized solution may not interdict flow
to the true demand node.
When multiple demand nodes are considered, the maximum flow to the
combined demand nodes will be less than or equal to the sum of the maximum flows
for each individual node. This is due to the nature of the network, where an arc that
provides flow to one node may also provide flow to other nodes. In this case, multiple
demand nodes could compete for flow. Interdiction of an arc used jointly will tend to
decrease flow to both nodes. This will tend to increase the effectiveness of interdiction
efforts by further restricting the flow of already limited supplies.
C. ANALYSIS OF MODEL 2
1. Scenario
The mission planner has 11 interdiction teams available for use in
operations against suspected drug production sites. Intelligence indicates that there
is a drug production site, or demand node, near node 42. The planner is now faced
with the task of determining the optimal strategy in placing his teams to isolate node
42 and as many additional nodes around it as possible. Since the number of teams is
limited, the planner is interested in the marginal increase or decrease in the number
of nodes isolated if more or less teams are used. By keeping some teams back from
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the operation, the planner has more flexibility to respond to information about any
other demand locations. The planner is also interested if the strategy developed for
node 42 remains optimal if the demand node was really located at another node in the
vicinity of node 42.
2. Optimal Strategy
Setting a 42 = 1 in the model to indicate the demand node, the basic,
unweighted model can be solved. The solution from the model using all 11 teams is
shown in Figure 5. The solution appears reasonable and the nodes are contiguous.
To look at different solutions based on the number of teams, the planner runs the
model for different allocation of teams. The Table 7 shows the nodes isolated by the
optimal strategy for the indicated number of teams.
TABLE 7
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Figure 5 Interdiction of Node 42 with 11 teams
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The results indicate that the planner could divert several teams from the
current mission and still isolate node 42 and the nodes in the immediate vicinity.
There is also no benefit in placing 9 teams instead of 8 teams, because the additional
team is does not change the optimal strategy.
Based on the reliability of the information that identifies node 42 as a
demand node, the planner may also want to consider that the true demand node is in
the vicinity of node 42, either node 26, 41, 43, 64, or 65. By setting the number of
teams to 11 and changing the demand node location, it is possible to determine the
optimal strategy for each different node. In this case, the resulting optimal strategy
is the same for each node listed above. With the information from the model, the
planner can continue planning the mission, choosing from several alternate strategies.
3. Model 2 Insights
It is possible to draw insights from this model that can guide operational
planning. In almost all cases, the optimal solution includes placing interdiction teams
along the road rather than on the river segments which are incident to the road. By
interdicting the road in two places, it is possible to stop flow along a significant
number of river segments. Additionally, the cumulative cost of cutting each individual
river segment incident to the road between two road nodes is greater than cutting the
road twice. While this may be a function of the interdiction costs assigned to the arcs
involved, it follows that it would be more efficient to interdict one large shipment than
an equal quantity of chemicals broken down into smaller shipments. Another insight
is that the placement of interdiction teams downstream from the demand node is
limited to one major arc, which in conjunction with cutting the road, isolates a branch
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of the river. As fewer teams are available, the size of the branch decreases. Taken to
an extreme with unlimited teams available, the optimal solution would be to cut all the
arcs coming out of supply nodes.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BENEFITS OF THE MODELS
This thesis has developed mathematical programming models to solve the
difficult problem of allocating interdiction assets to arcs in a network, in one case to
minimize the maximum flow and in the other case to surround and isolate a target
demand node. The formulations, as integer programs, appear easy to solve in practice
and any number of solvers could be used, as opposed to the specialized algorithms
described in earlier papers. Furthermore, the formulations are generalizable and allow
easy comparison of various scenarios. (Generalizations and large scenarios, might,
however, yield problems which are not so easy to solve.)
By changing the number of teams or the location of demand nodes, it is possible
to determine the impact of change. In the first model, the addition of one more
interdiction team to the effort can be weighed against the marginal change in the flow.
The decision-maker can then determine if the resulting decrease in flow is worth the
cost of committing that asset. Comparison of scenarios in Model 2 provides the
planner with the capability to determine the minimum number of interdiction assets
required to isolate the demand node. If sufficient assets are not available, the planner
may then need to modify the mission or request more assets. However, if sufficient
assets are available, the planner may be able to isolate the demand node with fewer
assets than originally allocated to the mission. If the planner is familiar with the area
of operations, he will be able to determine which allocation of assets is sufficient to
cover a reasonable area around the suspected demand node.
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Model 2 also allows the planner the flexibility of using a weighting scheme on
the nodes surrounding the suspected demand node. This could be used if the
unweighted model solution isolates a set of nodes which are not contiguous with the
demand node.
B. ENHANCEMENTS TO THE MODEL
One might explicitly consider the probability of successfully interdicting a
shipment of precursor chemicals that passes through an interdicted road or river
segment. For instance, consider river traffic which is the primary means of
transportation in the region. The river traffic includes large barges loaded with large,
bulky items such as logs or 55-gallon drums. Interdiction teams could have a difficult
time locating precursor chemicals if the chemicals are hidden in or around the cargo,
or in false compartments on the vessel. Additionally, if traffic along a road or river is
heavy, the interdiction teams may not be able to check each vehicle or vessel, but only
a certain percentage.
Neither model incorporates time, which plays a major role in the success of
interdiction operations. If interdiction teams stay stationary too long, they can become
ineffective since the network user will find bypasses around the teams. An improved
model would yield interdiction plans which are randomized over time.
An ideal model would combine attributes from both the models presented here,
maximizing the nodes interdicted around a suspected demand node and minimizing
the flow to that node. However, because the two models have different purposes,
combining them would be difficult.
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C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The most critical aspect of using the models is the quality of the intelligence
gathered. Multiple sources may provide contradictory intelligence. Who and what to
believe is difficult to answer, and over time could change. Focusing collection assets
to confirm or deny intelligence reports may mean the difference between directing
interdiction efforts against an arc that is not used or not interdicting an arc which is
used.
In order to use the models presented in this thesis, the network must be
transformed into a set of arcs and nodes, with assigned arc capacities and interdiction
costs. For the precursor chemical interdiction problem, the transportation network
is quite large and changes occur seasonally. Because of this, the true network may not
be known. However, a totally accurate depiction of the network might not be required
and river segments could be aggregated to form a less extensive network. It would,
however, be difficult to accurately assign values for the attributes to each segment and
to interdict such. These values could be based on a best guess by a subject-matter
expert and as interdiction operations progress and data is collected on effectiveness,
the values could be updated.
A noticeable shortcoming of interdiction operations is the lack of well-defined,
measurable Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). Effectiveness can be measured in terms
of quantity seized, but it is difficult to estimate the quantity of goods that were not
transported or diverted because of interdiction efforts. Other MOEs can be the
percentage of time interdiction teams are operating or the number of contacts that
result in searches. Regardless of the MOE chosen, the true effectiveness of
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interdiction operations will not be known unless the interdicted party provides the
information.
Two other considerations involve the interruption of legitimate transportation
of goods. The interdiction teams need a method of rapidly identifying liquids that are
found during searches. Liquids may be found in unmarked or mislabeled containers.
In either case, the liquid may have a legitimate purpose in the area to which it is being
transported. If legitimate shipments are seized until positive identification is made,
legal trade is disrupted. Similarly, if the local populace who rely on the waterways and
roads for daily transportation are stopped and searched every time they use the
transportation system, their support for the counter-narcotic efforts may decrease.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The models developed in this thesis could provide analytical tools to the Drug
Enforcement Agency agents who plan riverine and ground interdiction operations in
the Mamore river basin of Bolivia which could help them position their limited
interdiction assets on the waterways and roads to most effectively stem the flow of
precursor chemicals. The models are easily transportable and can be solved on a 486
MS-DOS personal computer with commercial solvers. GAMS was used to formulate
the models because of availability and ease of programming. GAMS/ZOOM was unable
to consistently provide solutions for Model 1, but was able to solve Model 2. XA was
able to solve both models more rapidly and always provided a solution. Therefore, XA
is recommended over GAMS/ZOOM as the solver.
The examples in Chapter III show some of the possible uses of the models.
While this thesis is just a small part of the overall counter-narcotic, drug interdiction
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effort, implementation of the models might improve the effectiveness of interdiction
operations, resulting in moving us one step closer to a solution to our drug problem.
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APPENDIX A NETWORK GENERATION
IJEDGES DATA - LISTING OF ARCS IN THE NETWORK
( 1. 2) = 1, ( 2. 1) = 1 ( 24. 40) = 1
,
( 40. 24) = 1
( 2. 3) = 1 , ( 3. 2) = 1 ( 25. 41) = 1
,
( 41. 25) = 1
( 2. 4) = 1 , ( 4. 2) = 1 ( 26. 42) = 1
,
( 42. 26) = 1
( 3. 5) = 1 , ( 5. 3) = 1 ( 26. 43) = 1 ( 43. 26) = 1
( 3. 6) = 1
,
( 6. 3) = 1 1 . 27. 44) = 1 ( 44. 27) = 1
( 4. 7) = 1
,
( 7. 4) = 1 ( 27. 45) = 1 ( 45. 27) = 1
( 5. 8) = 1
, ( 8. 5) = 1 ( ! 28. 46) = 1 ( 46. 28) = 1
( 6. 9) = 1
,
( 9. 6) = 1 1 ; 29. 47) = 1 ( 47. 29) = 1
( 6. 10) == 1 , ( 10. 6) = « 1 1 ; 30. 48) = 1 ( 48. 30) = 1
( 7. 11) =- 1 , ( 11. 7) = = 1 1 ; 31. 49) = 1 ( 49. 31) = 1
( 7. 12) == 1 , ( 12. 7) == 1 1 ; 31. 50) = 1 ( 50. 31) = 1
( 8. 13) == 1 , ( 13. 8) == 1 1; 33. 51) = 1 , ( 51. 33) = 1
( 8. 14) == 1 , ( 14. 8) == 1 1; 33. 52) = 1
,
( 52. 33) = 1
( 9. 15) == 1 , ( 15. 9) =- 1 1; 34. 53) = 1 , ( 53. 34) = 1
( 9. 16) .= 1 , ( 16. 9) =: 1 1: 34. 54) = 1 , ( 54. 34) = 1
( 10. 17) = 1
,
( 17. 10) = 1 1; 36. 55) = 1
,
( 55. 36) = 1
( 11. 18) = 1 ( 18. 11) = 1 ; 36. 56) = 1
,
( 56. 36) = 1
( 11. 19) = 1 ( 19. 11) = 1 ( 37. 57) = 1
,
( 57. 37) = 1
( 12. 20) = 1 ( 20. 12) = 1 ; 37. 58) = 1
,
( 58. 37) = 1
( 12. 21) = 1 ( 21. 12) = 1 ( 38. 59) = 1
,
( 59. 38) = 1
( 13. 22) = 1 ( 22. 13) = 1 1: 39. 60) = 1
,
( 60. 39) = 1
( 13. 23) = 1 ( 23. 13) = 1 1: 39. 61) = 1
,
( 61. 39) = 1
( 15. 24) = 1 ( 24. 15) = 1 1: 40. 62) = 1
,
( 62. 40) = 1
( 16. 25) = 1 ( 25. 16) = 1 1: 41. 63) = 1
,
( 63. 41) = 1
( 16. 26) = 1 ( 26. 16) = 1 ; 42. 64) = 1
,
( 64. 42) = 1
( 17. 27) = 1 (27. 17) = 1 1( 42. 65) = 1
,
( 65. 42) = 1
( 18. 28) = 1 ( 28. 18) = 1 [ 44. 66) = 1
,
( 66. 44) = 1
( 18. 29) = 1 ( 29. 18) = 1 ( 45. 67) = 1
,
( 67. 45) = 1
( 19. 30) = 1 ( 30. 19) = 1 : 45. 68) = 1
,
( 68. 45) = 1
( 19. 31) = 1 ( 31. 19) = 1 ( 46. 69) = 1
,
( 69. 46) = 1
( 20. 32) = 1 ( 32. 20) = 1 ( 46. 70) = 1
,
( 70. 46) = 1
( 20. 33) = 1 ( 33. 20) = 1 ( 47. 71) = 1 ( 71. 47) = 1
( 21. 34) = 1 ( 34. 21) = 1 ( 48. 72) = 1
,
( 72. 48) = 1
( 21. 35) = 1 ( 35. 21) = 1 ( 49. 73) = 1 , ( 73. 49) = 1
( 22. 36) = 1
,
( 36. 22) = 1 ( 49. 74) = 1
,
( 74. 49) = 1
( 23. 37) = 1
,
( 37. 23) = 1 ( 51. 75) = 1 , ( 75. 51) = 1
( 23. 38) = 1
,
( 38. 23) = 1 ( 51. 76) = 1 , ( 76. 51) = 1
( 24. 39) = 1
,
( 39. 24) = 1 [ 54. 77) = 1 , ( 77. 54) = 1
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( 54. 78) =
( 55. 79) =
( 55. 80) =
( 57. 81) =
( 57. 82) =
( 59. 83) =
( 59. 84) =
( 60. 85) =
( 60. 86) =
( 62. 87) =
( 62. 88) =
( 63. 89) =
( 63. 90) =
( 64. 91) =
( 64. 92) =
( 65. 93) :
( 66. 94) .
( 67. 95) :
( 67. 96) :














































































































































. 70) = 1
. 71) = 1
. 71) = 1
. 72) = 1
72) = 1
73) = 1
. 73) = 1
74) = 1
75) = 1








( 82. 83) = i
,
( 83. 82) = 1
( 83. 84) = i
,
( 84. 83) = 1
( 84. 85) = i
,
( 85. 84) = 1
( 85. 86) = i
,
( 86. 85) = 1
( 86. 87) = i
,
( 87. 86) = 1
( 87. 88) = i ( 88. 87) = 1
( 88. 89) = i ( 89. 88) = 1
( 89. 90) = i ( 90. 89) = 1
( 90. 91) = i ( 91. 90) = 1
( 91. 92) = i ( 92. 91) = 1
( 92. 93) = i ( 93. 92) = 1
( 93. 94) = i
,
( 94. 93) = 1
( 94. 95) = i
,
( 95. 94) = 1
( 95. 96) = i
,
( 96. 95) = 1
( 96. 97) = i
,
( 97. 96) = 1
( 97. 98) = i
,
( 98. 97) = 1
( 98. 99) = i
,
( 99. 98) = 1
( 99.100) == 1
,










































INTCOST DATA - INTERDICTION COST FOR EACH ARC
/
( 1. 2) = 13 , ( 2. 1) = 13 ( 3. 6) = 7,(6. 3) = 7
( 2. 3) = 8 , ( 3. 2) = 8 ( 4. 7) = 11, ( 7. 4) = 11
( 2. 4) = 13 , ( 4. 2) = 13 ( 5. 8) = 6,(8. 5) = 6
( 3. 5) = 10 , ( 5. 3) = 10 ( 6. 9) = 9,(9. 6) = 9
45
( 6. 10) = 11, ( 10. 6) = 11 ( 37. 57) = 2
,
( 57. 37) = 2
( 7. 11) = 9, ( 11. 7) = 9 ( 37. 58) = 3, ( 58. 37) = 3
( 7. 12) = 10, ( 12. 7) = 10 ( 38. 59) = 2
,
( 59. 38) = 2
( 8. 13) = 6, ( 13. 8) = 6 ( 39. 60) = 3, ( 60. 39) = 3
( 8. 14) = 8, ( 14. 8) = 8 ( 39. 61) = 3, ( 61. 39) = 3
( 9. 15) = 8, ( 15. 9) = 8 ( 40. 62) = 2
,
( 62. 40) = 2
( 9. 16) = 6, ( 16. 9) = 6 ( 41. 63) = 3, ( 63. 41) = 3
( 10. 17) = 8, ( 17. 10) = 8 ( 42. 64) = 3, ( 64. 42) = 3
( 11. 18) = 5
,
( 18. 11) = 5 ( 42. 65) = 2
,
( 65. 42) = 2
( 11. 19) = 9 , ( 19. 11) = 9 ( 44. 66) = 2
,
( 66. 44) = 2
( 12. 20) = 8, ( 20. 12) = 8 ( 45. 67) = 2
,
( 67. 45) = 2
( 12. 21) = 6
,
( 21. 12) = 6 ( 45. 68) = 2
,
( 68. 45) = 2
( 13. 22) = 4
,
( 22. 13) = 4 ( 46. 69) = 3, ( 69. 46) = 3
( 13. 23) = 7
,
( 23. 13) = 7 ( 46. 70) = 3
,
( 70. 46) = 3
( 15. 24) = 6
,
( 24. 15) = 6 (:47. 71) = 3 ( 71. 47) = 3
( 16. 25) = 7
,
( 25. 16) = 7 1 ; 48. 72) = 2 ( 72. 48) = 2
( 16. 26) = 5 ( 26. 16) = 5 1 ! 49. 73) = 3 ( 73. 49) = 3
( 17. 27) = 4 ( 27. 17) = 4 1 ; 49. 74) = 2 ( 74. 49) = 2
( 18. 28) = 5 ( 28. 18) = 5 1 ; 51. 75) = 3 ( 75. 51) = 3
( 18. 29) = 6 ( 29. 18) = 6 l; 51. 76) = 3 ( 76. 51) = 3
( 19. 30) = 4 ( 30. 19) = 4 1; 54. 77) = 3
,
( 77. 54) = 3
( 19. 31) = 7 ( 31. 19) = 7 ; 54. 78) = 2
,
( 78. 54) = 2
( 20. 32) = 4 ( 32. 20) = 4 { 55. 79) = 1
,
( 79. 55) = 1
( 20. 33) = 7
,
( 33. 20) = 7 C 55. 80) = 1 ( 80. 55) = 1
( 21. 34) = 6
,
( 34. 21) = 6 ( 57. 81) = 1
,
( 81. 57) = 1
( 21. 35) = 7
,
( 35. 21) = 7 ( 57. 82) = 1
,
( 82. 57) = 1
( 22. 36) = 4
,
( 36. 22) = 4 ( 59. 83) = 1
,
( 83. 59) = 1
( 23. 37) = 5
,
( 37. 23) = 5 ( 59. 84) = 1
,
( 84. 59) = 1
( 23. 38) = 5
,
( 38. 23) = 5 ( 60. 85) = 1
,
( 85. 60) = 1
( 24. 39) = 4
,
( 39. 24) = 4 ( 60. 86) = 1 , ( 86. 60) = 1
( 24. 40) = 3
,
( 40. 24) = 3 ( 62. 87) = 1 , ( 87. 62) = 1
( 25. 41) = 4
,
(41. 25) = 4 ( 62. 88) = 1 , ( 88. 62) = 1
( 26. 42) = 4
,
( 42. 26) = 4 ( 63. 89) = 1 , ( 89. 63) = 1
( 26. 43) = 5
,
( 43. 26) = 5 ( 63. 90) = 1 , ( 90. 63) = 1
( 27. 44) = 5
,
( 44. 27) = 5 ( 64. 91) = 1 , ( 91. 64) = 1
( 27. 45) = 5 , ( 45. 27) = 5 ( 64. 92) = 1 , ( 92. 64) = 1
( 28. 46) = 5
,
( 46. 28) = 5 ( 65. 93) = 1 , ( 93. 65) = 1
( 29. 47) = 3
,
( 47. 29) = 3 ( 66. 94) = 1 , ( 94. 66) = 1
( 30. 48) = 3 , ( 48. 30) = 3 ( 67. 95) = 1 , ( 95. 67) = 1
( 31. 49) = 3 , ( 49. 31) = 3 ( 67. 96) = 1 , ( 96. 67) = 1
( 31. 50) = 3 , ( 50. 31) = 3 ( 68. 97) = 1 , ( 97. 68) = 1
( 33. 51) = 5 , ( 51. 33) = 5 ( 69. 98) = 1 , ( 98. 69) = 1
( 33. 52) = 4
,
( 52. 33) = 4 ( 69. 99) = 1 , ( 99. 69) = 1
( 34. 53) = 4 , ( 53. 34) = 4 ( 70.100) = 1 , (100. 70) = 1
( 34. 54) = 4 , ( 54. 34) = 4 (71.101) = 1 , (101. 71) = 1
( 36. 55) = 3 , ( 55. 36) = 3 ( 71.102) = 1 , (102. 71) = 1
( 36. 56) = 2 , ( 56. 36) = 2 ( 72.103) = 1 , (103. 72) = 1
46
( 72.104) = 1
,
(104. 72) = 1
( 73.105) = 1
,
(105. 73) = 1
( 73.106) = 1
,
(106. 73) = 1
( 74.107) = 1
,
(107. 74) = 1
( 75.108) = 1
,
(108. 75) = 1
( 75.109) = 1
,
(109. 75) = 1
( 77.110) = 1
,
(110. 77) = 1
(77.111) = 1
,
(111. 77) = 1
( 78.112) = 1
,
(112. 78) = 1
( 78.113) = 1
,
(113. 78) = 1
( 79. 80) = 3
, ( 80. 79) = 3
( 80. 81) = 1
,
( 81. 80) = 1
( 81. 82) = 3
,
( 82. 81) = 3
( 82. 83) = 1
,
( 83. 82) = 1
( 83. 84) = 2
,
( 84. 83) = 2
( 84. 85) = 3 , ( 85. 84) = 3
( 85. 86) = 1
, ( 86. 85) = 1
( 86. 87) = 4
, ( 87. 86) = 4
( 87. 88) = 3
,
( 88. 87) = 3
( 88. 89) = 3 , ( 89. 88) = 3
( 89. 90) = 3 , ( 90. 89) = 3
( 90. 91) = 2
, ( 91. 90) = 2
( 91. 92) = 3 , ( 92. 91) = 3
( 92. 93) = 1
,
( 93. 92) = 1
( 93. 94) = 1 , ( 94. 93) = 1
( 94. 95) = 2
,
( 95. 94) = 2
( 95. 96) = 4
,
( 96. 95) = 4
( 96. 97) = 4 , ( 97. 96) = 4
( 97. 98) = 3
,
( 98. 97) = 3
( 98. 99) = 3
,
( 99. 98) = 3
(99.100) = 2
,
(100. 99) = 2
(100.101) = 1











































( 2. 1) = 14
( 2. 3) = 14 , ( 3. 2) = 14
( 2. 4) = 13 , ( 4. 2) = 13
( 3. 5) = 13 , ( 5. 3) = 13
( 3. 6) = 12 , ( 6. 3) = 12
( 4. 7) = 13
,
( 7. 4) = 13
( 5. 8) = 13 , ( 8. 5) = 13
( 6. 9) = 12 , ( 9. 6) = 12
( 6. 10) = 11 , ( 10. 6) = 11
( 7. 11) = 14 , ( 11. 7) = 14
( 7. 12) = 13
,
( 12. 7) = 13
( 8. 13) = 11 , ( 13. 8) = 11
( 8. 14) = 14 , ( 14. 8) = 14
( 9. 15) = 11 , ( 15. 9) = 11
( 9. 16) = 10 , ( 16. 9) = 10
( 10. 17) = 10
,
( 17. 10) = 10
( 11. 18) = 11 , ( 18. 11) = 11
( 11. 19) = 11 , ( 19. 11) = 11
( 12. 20) = 12 , ( 20. 12) = 12
( 12. 21) = 12 , ( 21. 12) = 12
( 13. 22) = 12
,
( 22. 13) = 12
( 13. 23) = 12
,
( 23. 13) = 12
( 15. 24) = 9 , ( 24. 15) == 9
( 16. 25) = 13 , ( 25. 16) = 13
( 16. 26) = 12
,
( 26. 16) = 12
( 17. 27) = 9 , ( 27. 17) == 9
( 18. 28) = 12 , ( 28. 18) = 12
( 18. 29) = 9 , ( 29. 18) == 9
( 19. 30) = 9 , ( 30. 19) == 9
( 19. 31) = 10 , ( 31. 19) = 10
( 20. 32) = 14
,
( 32. 20) = 14
( 20. 33) = 10
, ( 33. 20) = 10
( 21. 34) = 10 , ( 34. 21) = 10
( 21. 35) = 9
,
( 35. 21) == 9
( 22. 36) = 12 , ( 36. 22) = 12
( 23. 37) = 10
,
( 37. 23) = 10
( 23. 38) = 12 , ( 38. 23) = 12
( 24. 39) = 12 , ( 39. 24) = 12
( 24. 40) = 11 , ( 40. 24) = 11
( 25. 41) = 13 , ( 41. 25) = 13
( 26. 42) = 14 , ( 42. 26) = 14
( 26. 43) = 11 , ( 43. 26) = 11
( 27. 44) = 11
,
( 44. 27) = 11
( 27. 45) = 10
,
( 45. 27) = 10
( 28. 46) = 13
,
( 46. 28) = 13
( 29. 47) = 14
,
I 47. 29) = 14
( 30. 48) = 12
,
( 48. 30) = 12
( 31. 49) = 8,( 49. 31) = 8
( 31. 50) = 13, ( 50. 31) = 13
( 33. 51) = 13, ( 51. 33) = 13
( 33. 52) = 12
,
( 52. 33) = 12
( 34. 53) = 13, ( 53. 34) = 13
( 34. 54) = 9,( 54. 34) = 9
( 36. 55) = 13, ( 55. 36) = 13
( 36. 56) = 11
,
( 56. 36) = 11
( 37. 57) = 12
,
( 57. 37) = 12
( 37. 58) = 11
,
( 58. 37) = 11
( 38. 59) = 13, ( 59. 38) = 13
( 39. 60) = 13, ( 60. 39) = 13
( 39. 61) = 10, ( 61. 39) = 10
( 40. 62) = 11
,
( 62. 40) = 11
( 41. 63) = 14
,
( 63. 41) = 14
( 42. 64) = 13, ( 64. 42) = 13
( 42. 65) = 11
,
( 65. 42) = 11
( 44. 66) = 13, ( 66. 44) = 13
( 45. 67) = 12
,
( 67. 45) = 12
( 45. 68) = 8, ( 68. 45) = 8
( 46. 69) = 11
,
( 69. 46) = 11
( 46. 70) = 7
, ( 70. 46) = 7
(47. 71) = 9
, ( 71. 47) = 9
( 48. 72) = 8, ( 72. 48) = 8
( 49. 73) = 10, ( 73. 49) = 10
( 49. 74) = 8, ( 74. 49) = 8
( 51. 75) = 11
,
( 75. 51) = 11
( 51. 76) = 9 , ( 76. 51) = 9
( 54. 77) = 12
,
( 77. 54) = 12
( 54. 78) = 10
,
( 78. 54) = 10
( 55. 79) = 9 , ( 79. 55) = 9
( 55. 80) = 11
,
( 80. 55) = 11
( 57. 81) = 7 , ( 81. 57) = 7
( 57. 82) = 8, ( 82. 57) = 8
( 59. 83) = 10, ( 83. 59) = 10
( 59. 84) = 8,( 84. 59) = 8
( 60. 85) = 8,( 85. 60) = 8
( 60. 86) = 6 , ( 86. 60) = 6
( 62. 87) = 13, ( 87. 62) = 13
( 62. 88) = 6 , ( 88. 62) = 6
( 63. 89) = 12, ( 89. 63) = 12
( 63. 90) = 7 , ( 90. 63) = 7
( 64. 91) = 7 , ( 91. 64) = 7
48
( 64. 92) =
( 65. 93) =
( 66. 94) =
( 67. 95) =
( 67. 96) =
( 68. 97) =
( 69. 98) =















( 79. 80) =
( 80. 81) =
( 81. 82) =
( 82. 83) =
( 83. 84) =
( 84. 85) =
( 85. 86) =
( 86. 87) =
( 87. 88) =
( 88. 89) =
( 89. 90) =
( 90. 91) =
( 91. 92) =
( 92. 93) =
( 93. 94) =
( 94. 95) =
( 95. 96) =
( 96. 97) =
( 97. 98) =








( 92. 64) = 13
9
, ( 93. 65) = 9
14
,
( 94. 66) = 14
12
,
( 95. 67) = 12
8
,
( 96. 67) = 8
7
, ( 97. 68) = 7
14
,
( 98. 69) = 14
8
, ( 99. 69) = 8
13
,
(100. 70) = 13
6
,
(101. 71) = 6
11
,
(102. 71) = 11
12
,
(103. 72) = 12
7
,
(104. 72) = 7
13
,
(105. 73) = 13
13
,
(106. 73) = 13
7
,
(107. 74) = 7
9
,
(108. 75) = 9
7
,
(109. 75) = 7
12
,
(110. 77) = 12
13
,
(111. 77) = 13
7
,
(112. 78) = 7
8
,
(113. 78) = 8
6
,
( 80. 79) = 6
6
,
( 81. 80) = 6
6
,
( 82. 81) = 6
6
,
( 83. 82) = 6
6
,
( 84. 83) = 6
6
,
( 85. 84) = 6
6
,
( 86. 85) = 6
6
,
( 87. 86) = 6
6
,
( 88. 87) = 6
6
,
( 89. 88) = 6
6
,
( 90. 89) = 6
6
, ( 91. 90) = 6
6
,
( 92. 91) = 6
6
,
( 93. 92) = 6
6
,
( 94. 93) = 6
6
, ( 95. 94) = 6
6
,
( 96. 95) = 6
6
, ( 97. 96) = 6
6
,
( 98. 97) = 6
6
,
( 99. 98) = 6
6
,










































NODES DATA - TOTAL NUMBER OF NODES IN NETWORK
I NETWORK NODES / 1 * 113 /;
SUPPLY NODES - INDICATES WHICH NODES ARE SUPPLY NODES
ALPHAFXCr ) = 0;
ALPHA.FXC79' ) = 0;
ALPHA.FXC113' ) = 0;
50
APPENDIX B MODEL 1 FORMULATION
MODEL 1 - MINIMIZATION OF MAXIMUM FLOW
$TITLE The Network Interdiction Model
$STITLE Minimize the flow
*
* WRITTEN BY : Robert L. Steinrauf
* SMC 2862, NPS
* Monterey, CA 93943
* (408) 649-1063
*
* GAMS OPTIONS and DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS-
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST
OPTIONS LIMCOL = 0, LIMROW = 0, SOLPRINT = OFF;
OPTIONS RESLIM = 100, ITERLIM = 10000 ;
OPTIONS OPTCR = 0.001;


















TFLOW 'total flow to demand node';
BINARY VARIABLE
ALPHA(I) '1 indicates node is in T
DELTA(I,J) 'arc (I,J) is interdicted ';
POSITIVE VARIABLE





OBJFLOW 'total flow through network'
CUTSET(I,J) 'determines cutset'
TEAMTOT 'constraint on total number of teams'
;




ALPHA(I) - ALPHA(J) + BETA(I,J) + DELTA(I,J) =G= 0;
TEAMTOT..
SUM((I,J), DELTA(I,J) * COST(I,J)) =L= TEAMS;





SOLVE MINFLOW USING MIP MINIMIZING TFLOW;
* Reports
PARAMETER REPORT(V) Number of teams employed;







APPENDIX C MODEL 2 FORMULATION
MODEL 2 - MAXIMUM SET OF ISOLATED NODES
$TITLE The Network Interdiction Model
$STITLE Maximize the area isolated
*
* WRITTEN BY : Robert L. Steinrauf
* SMC 2862, NPS
* Monterey, CA 93943
* (408) 649-1063
*
* GAMS OPTIONS and DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS-
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST
OPTIONS LIMCOL = 0, LIMROW = 0, SOLPRINT = OFF
;
OPTIONS RESLIM = 500, ITERLIM = 10000
;
OPTIONS OPTCR = 0.01, INTEGERl = 122 ;
OPTIONS mip =xa ;















TNODE 'total nodes isolated'
;
BINARY VARIABLE
ALPHA(I) '1 node is isolated'
;
POSITIVE VARIABLE
DELTA(U) 'arc (I,J) is interdicted ';
DELTA.UP(I,J) $ ARC(I,J) = 1;
EQUATIONS
OBJNODE 'total nodes isolated in network'
CUTSET(I,J) 'determines cutset'
TEAMTOT 'constraint on total number of teams' ;
OBJNODE.. TNODE = E = SUM(J,ALPHA(J));
* subject to
CUTSET(I,J)$(ARC(I,J))..
ALPHA(I) - ALPHA(J) + DELTA(I,J) =G= 0;
TEAMTOT..
SUM((I,J), DELTA(I,J) * COST (I,J)) =L= TEAMS;
MODEL MAXNODE /OBJNODE, CUTSET, TEAMTOT /;
$ INCLUDE alpha.sup
ALPHA.FXC42') = 1;
SOLVE MAXNODE USING MIP MAXIMIZING TNODE;
* Reports
PARAMETER REPORTS, *) Number of teams employed;
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